In CALDWELL v. STATE, No. SC08-1519 (Fla. Jul. 8, 2010), a police officer believed the Defendant had committed burglaries. The next day, the officer approached the Defendant in a public place to speak with him; the Defendant engaged in a consensual conversation. During that conversation the officer read the warning required by Miranda v.
Arizona, 384 U.S. 426 (1966), to the Defendant. The Defendant subsequently made damaging admissions.
The Court held that reading the warning does not necessarily transform a citizen encounter into a Fourth Amendment investigatory stop: "the warnings might in some circumstances indicate to a reasonable person that he or she is being arrested and therefore not free to leave. Here, however, [the Defendant] asked the officer why he was being arrested and was specifically informed that he was not under arrest, but rather that the officer merely wanted to make sure [the Defendant] was aware of his rights. A reasonable person, having received this clarification, would not have believed that he was under arrest. Further, the circumstances of the encounter after the warnings indicate that the tenor of the conversation remained consensual.... The officer did not threaten to take [the Defendant] to the police station or place him under formal arrest." Slip opinion at 29. "Based on the totality of the circumstances, we conclude that a reasonable person in [the Defendant]‟s position would have understood that he was free to remain silent or end the encounter had he chosen to do so. Further, we hold that Miranda warnings do not result in a seizure as a matter of law. While we do not discount that possibility that Miranda warnings may increase the coercive atmosphere of a police-citizen encounter outside the context of a custodial interrogation, we find that the warnings did not result in a seizure in this case." Slip opinion at 31-32.
In STATE v. TAMULONIS, No. 2D09-4081 (Fla. 2d DCA Jul. 9, 2010), a detective obtained the Defendant's patient profiles and prescriptions from two pharmacies without a subpoena or warrant. The DCA held that §893.07(4) Florida Statutes (2007 and 2008) does not require law enforcement officers to procure a search warrant or subpoena prior to obtaining controlled substance records from pharmacies. Section 893.07 is an exception to the right to privacy under article I, section 23 of the Florida Constitution because the State has a compelling interest in regulating controlled substances. Section 893.07 is narrowly tailored to meet that interest because (1) the statute only applies to controlled substance records, (2) the records do not convey information about a patient's medical condition, and (3) such data is not available to the general public, but only to law enforcement officers whose duty it is to enforce the laws of this state relating to controlled substances.
In KOCH v. STATE, No. 2D09-1030 (Fla. 2d DCA Jul. 7, 2010), the court held that a person charged with fleeing and eluding a police officer under § 316.1935(2) Florida Statutes (2007) was entitled to a jury instruction on a permissive lesser included offense, refusal to obey an officer's lawful order under § 316.072(3).
In KEZAL v. STATE, No. 2D09-1010 (Fla. 2d DCA Jul. 9, 2010), the circuit court incorrectly concluded that it could not impose a downward departure sentence under § 921.0026(2)(j) Florida Statutes (2005) for a felony DUI offense because every DUI offense is inherently unsophisticated. The DCA held that a decision by a trial court whether to depart from the guidelines is a two-part process. The trial court must first determine whether it can depart-whether the defendant has met the burden of establishing sufficient factual support for a valid legal ground. The trial court must then decide whether it should depart, which is a judgment call within the sound discretion of the court. §921.0026(2)(j) can provide a valid basis for a departure in a felony DUI case.
In MURTAGH v. HURLEY, No. 2D10-246 (Fla. 2d DCA Jul. 7, 2010), the court held that equitable relief is ordinarily not available to enjoin a person from making allegedly defamatory statements absent an independent ground for invoking equitable jurisdiction. However injunctive relief may be proper where defamatory statements are uttered or published incident to another tort, here tortious interference with advantageous business relationships.
