In KENTUCKY v. KING, No. 09-1272 (May 16, 2011), police officers followed a suspected drug dealer to an apartment complex. They smelled marijuana outside an apartment door, knocked loudly, and announced their presence. As soon as the officers began "banging on the door," they "could hear people inside moving," and "[i]t sounded as [though] things were being moved inside the apartment." An officer testified that "[t]hese noises... led the officers to believe that drug related evidence was about to be destroyed." Slip opinion at 2. The officers announced their intent to enter the apartment, kicked in the door. They saw drugs in plain view during a protective sweep of the apartment and found additional evidence during a subsequent search.
The Court held that a warrantless entry to a residence based on exigent circumstances is reasonable when the police did not create the exigency by engaging or threatening to engage in conduct violating the Fourth Amendment. The Court rejected the argument that the officers deliberately created the exigent circumstances with the bad faith intent to avoid the warrant requirement. Slip opinion at 11. The Court reasoned that a forceful knock may be necessary to alert the occupants that someone is at the door, and unless officers identify themselves loudly enough, occupants may not know who is at their doorstep. Slip opinion at 14-15. "When law enforcement officers who are not armed with a warrant knock on a door, they do no more than any private citizen might do. And whether the person who knocks on the door and requests the opportunity to speak is a police officer or a private citizen, the occupant has no obligation to open the door or to speak." Slip opinion at 16. The Court held that the conduct of the officers "was entirely consistent with the Fourth Amendment, and we are aware of no other evidence that might show that the officers either violated the Fourth Amendment or threatened to do so (for example, by announcing that they would break down the door if the occupants did not open the door voluntarily)." Slip opinion at 18.
The Court presumed that the officers "knew that there was possibly something that was going to be destroyed inside the apartment, and at that point, they explained that they were going to make entry. Given that this announcement was made after the exigency arose, it could not have created the exigency." Slip opinion at 19 (internal punctuation omitted). The Court concluded: "Like the court below, we assume for purposes of argument that an exigency existed. Because the officers in this case did not violate or threaten to violate the Fourth Amendment prior to the exigency, we hold that the exigency justified the warrantless search of the apartment." Slip opinion at 19.
In STATE v. FITZGERALD, No. 2D10-1689 (Fla. May 18, 2011), the court held that the State may prove a felony charge of being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence with evidence that the defendant was physically in a vehicle with the capability to operate it, regardless of whether the Defendant was actually operating it at the time.
A police officer testified that he saw a car variously described as "parked" and "stopped in an intersection" at around midnight. The car's headlights were on. The officer saw a pair of legs hanging out of an open passenger door, which caused him to be concerned. The officer stopped and approached, observing that the car's engine was not running.
As he walked by the passenger side, the officer observed that a male passenger's legs were hanging out of his side of the car, and he saw that the passenger was breathing and that his hands were empty. The officer then heard a voice say either "I'm not driving" or "I wasn't driving." The voice came from the driver's side, and the officer then observed the female Defendant sitting in the driver's seat. The officer looked over to the driver's side and saw the car keys in the Defendant's right hand. He observed that her speech was slurred and that she smelled of alcohol. He conducted a DUI investigation and ultimately arrested the Defendant. Her breath tests revealed alcohol levels of .201 and .218. The Defendant was charged with a third-degree felony pursuant to § 316.193(2)(b)(1) Florida Statutes (2008), because she allegedly has two prior DUI convictions. The trial court dismissed the information after determining that the State could not prove that the Defendant was in actual physical control of a vehicle at the time of the alleged offense. A passenger was present, leading to a possible inference that the passenger drove to the current location and then switched seats with the Defendant.
The DCA reversed, holding that "a legitimate inference to be drawn is that [the Defendant] placed herself behind the wheel and at any time could have started the car and driven away." Slip opinion at 5. The DCA concluded that the offense is one of general intent that punishes the intentional act of "placing oneself in actual physical control of a motor vehicle," which furthers the legitimate governmental interest of "protecting the public from the danger of an impaired person who places himself behind the wheel and could at any time and with little difficulty start the car and drive away." Here the keys were close enough for the Defendant to use them to start the car and drive away.
In STATE v. YARN, No. 2D10-2915 (Fla. 2d DCA May 20, 2011), the Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the information charging possession of a concealed firearm. The State filed a traverse stating additional facts. The trial court dismissed the information, specifically finding that the State had failed to establish that the Defendant concealed the firearm at the time he possessed it. The DCA reversed, holding that in its traverse, the State need not adduce the evidence necessary to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Instead, it must bring forward facts sufficient to show only the barest prima facie case. To meet its burden, the State may rely on circumstantial evidence and all inferences arising therefrom that are favorable to the State. To establish the barest prima facie case, the State must show only that a reasonable jury could find the defendant guilty of the charged crime under the most favorable construction of the evidence. Only when there is no construction of the undisputed facts and inferences therefrom that would allow a guilty verdict to be rendered should a motion to dismiss be granted. If the State files a sworn traverse that establishes a prima facie case of guilt, the motion to dismiss must be denied.
In the context of a charge of carrying a concealed firearm, the essential question is whether the firearm was "carried on or about a person in such a manner as to conceal the firearm from the ordinary sight of another person." § 790.001(2) Fla. Stat. (2009). The critical issue is whether the firearm is concealed from the ordinary observation of others; absolute invisibility to other persons is not indispensable to concealment. Instead, the court must consider all of the circumstances and all of the inferences involved in the individual case.
Because the additional facts contained in the State's traverse give rise to inferences sufficient to support a prima facie case of guilt, the trial court was required to deny the Defendant's motion to dismiss.
In GUARDADO v. STATE, No. 4D07-4422 (Fla. 4th DCA May 18, 2011), following a traffic crash were two passengers died, the State issued a subpoena for the driver's medical records to determine his blood alcohol over the driver's objection. Legal blood was drawn shortly after the crash, and later suppressed. There was no other testimony, no other evidence presented, and nothing proffered by the State as far as the odor of alcohol or anything considered to be impairment of the normal facilities. The State admitted that there was no information in the State's file that could have constituted independent probable cause at the time the medical blood subpoena was issued. The driver was eventually convicted of DUI manslaughter.
The DCA reversed the conviction, holding that the State failed to show a nexus between the medical records sought and the pending investigation. Instead, the State simply relied on the inadmissible legal blood to obtain the medical blood. The State did not rely on any lawful evidence which showed any nexus between the Defendant's medical blood and the traffic crash investigation; no police reports, arrest affidavits, or other documents were presented to the court. The DCA concluded that State's theory, "a crash plus a death always makes medical blood relevant," is not the law.
