In SMITH v. STATE, No. SC09-386 (Fla. Mar. 17, 2011), the Court held that a trial court can not deny a party the right to exercise a peremptory strike against a juror where the record does not establish that the juror was a member of a protected class. The Court held that a juror's surname, without more, is insufficient to trigger an inquiry as to whether the peremptory strike was exercised for a discriminatory reason. The Court reasoned that failing to require that there be a threshold demonstration that the juror was a member of a protected class has the potential to undermine the purpose for the protections required to prevent invidious discrimination in jury selection. The court was careful to point out that nothing in the opinion requires an evidentiary hearing to prove whether a potential juror is a member of a distinct ethnic group. Many times the identifying trait is physically visible, such as with race and gender. Slip opinion at 14.
In LAMB v. STATE, No. 2D09-5130 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 18, 2011), the Defendant was charged with obtaining drugs from a physician by withholding information. She moved to suppress certain clinical information which lae enforcement officers obtained from her physicians without a search warrant, a subpoena, or prior notice. The trial court denied the motion. The DCA reversed the trial court's order with regard to certain physicians' affidavits and lists of the Defendant's prescriptions. The DCA ordered that on remand, the trial court should reconsider the suppression of those items under § 456.057(7)(a) Florida Statutes (2008) and make specific findings as to which portions of the physician information constituted "reports and records relating to [the] examination or treatment" of the Defendant.
In STATE v. GILSON, No. 2D08-4524 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 18, 2011), the Defendant was convicted after jury trial of attempted first-degree murder of a law enforcement officer. The Defendant then sought and was granted postconviction relief in the form of a new trial. As the State prepared to retry the Defendant, both parties learned that certain evidence from the first trial had been destroyed despite the fact that it had been the subject of a protective order. The Defendant moved to dismiss the charge on the basis that the destroyed evidence was exculpatory and had been destroyed by the State in bad faith. The trial court granted the motion; the State appealed. The DCA reversed, reasoning that existing photographs of the evidence would be sufficient.
In HOUSTON v. STATE, No. 2D09-3546 (Fla. 2d DCA Mar. 18, 2011), the Defendant was convicted of second degree murder. The DCA reversed because an improper jury instruction was given. On the lesser included offense of attempted manslaughter the jury was instructed that to find the Defendant guilty, it must find, inter alia, that the Defendant "committed an act which was intended to cause the death of" the victim.
The Defendant did not object. On appeal the Defendant argued, and the DCA held, that the phrase "committed an act which was intended to cause the death of" the victim was fundamental error because it created an intent-to-kill element in the crime of attempted manslaughter. Slip opinion at 3. The DCA also noted that "while it may be true that no person can attempt to cause an unintentional act, a person can intend to commit an act, like firing a gun at another person, without intending to cause the death of that person." Slip opinion at 5.
