In MENDENHALL v. STATE, No. SC09-400 (Fla. Oct. 28, 2010), the Defendant was convicted of attempted second-degree murder using a firearm, which reclassified as a first-degree felony under the 10-20-Life statute, § 775.087 Florida Statutes (2004). The Court held that under the 10-20-Life statute, specifically § 775.087(2)(a)(3), a trial court can sentence a defendant to a mandatory minimum sentence that exceeds the statutory maximum sentence provided for in § 775.082.
The mandated "minimum term of imprisonment of not less than 25 years and not more than a term of imprisonment of life in prison" under §775.087(2)(a)(3) gives the trial court the discretion to impose a sentence anywhere within the range of twenty-five years to life, even if that sentence exceeds the statutory maximum of thirty years provided for under section 775.082(2)(c). The Court reasoned that under the rules of statutory construction, § 775.087(2)(a)(3), which specifically addresses a situation where a defendant, in the course of certain enumerated felonies, discharges a firearm and, as a result of the discharge, death or great bodily harm is inflicted upon any person, prevails over section 775.082(3)(b), which is a general sentencing statute and provides the sentences for all first-degree felonies. Section 775.082 covers sentencing for all crimes, including those involving the use of a firearm. On the other hand, the 10-20-Life statute addresses the mandatory minimum sentences for enumerated crimes involving the use or possession of a firearm. Slip opinion at 15-16.
In FESSENDEN v. STATE, No. 2D09-3595 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 29, 2010), the Defendant obtained a reversal of his judgments and sentences by the DCA on the ground that his questionable conduct did not constitute grand theft or a violation of the Florida RICO (Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations) Act. He then sought certification in the trial court that he is a wrongfully incarcerated person entitled to compensation under the Victims of Wrongful Incarceration Compensation, §§ 961.01-.07 Florida Statutes (2008). In this case of the first impression, the DCA held that that statute applies only to claims where orders vacating sentences have been entered based on exonerating evidence, not a mere reversal on appeal.
The DCA observed that an appellate court can reverse a criminal judgment and sentence employing at least four different rationales: (1) when a procedural error renders the judgment and sentence faulty; (2) when the State charged a defendant with a crime that it had probable cause to believe the defendant committed but for which it did not have the necessary proof at the time of trial; (3) when a crime has actually occurred but the State failed to prove that the defendant committed the crime; and (4) when the State proved its intended case but the proof did not, as a matter of law, constitute a crime. Slip opinion at 7-8.
Here the DCA reasoned that "[w]hen an appellate court reverses a judgment and sentence for lack of evidence, it does not make any determination that the defendant is actually innocent; it merely determines that the State did not provide evidence that could support a verdict of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. There is a substantial difference in our system of justice between the concept of 'not guilty' and that of 'actual innocence.'" Slip opinion at 8-9. The definition of wrongfully incarcerated person "includes a requirement that the trial court have issued its order under section 961.03. Section 961.03(1)(a) explains that in order to meet the definition of 'wrongfully incarcerated person,' the petitioner must establish that the conviction and sentence were vacated by an order 'based upon exonerating evidence.'
The petition itself must '[s]tate that verifiable and substantial evidence of actual innocence exists and state with particularity the nature and significance of the verifiable and substantial evidence of actual innocence.' § 961.03(1)(a)(1)." Slip opinion at 7. "The legislature was concerned about compensating persons who were actually innocent, but not necessarily about paying people who had been found not guilty." Slip opinion at 9. In the instant case, because the Defendant "obtained an order vacating his judgment and sentence based on the ruling of an appellate court as a matter of law, and not based on exonerating evidence of his actual innocence" the DCA concluded that the statute, "strictly construed, does not encompass his claim." Slip opinion at 2.
In FLOYD v. STATE, No. 2D09-3245 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 27, 2010), the Defendant was charged with several bank robberies in Haynes City. The Haynes City Police Department filed a verified complaint for probable cause and for final order of forfeiture of the Defendant's 1992 Pontiac Firebird based on its use in the robbery of a SunTrust Bank. The complaint identified the bank by name and location, the bank teller by name, the manner in which the Defendant demanded money, and the amount of money stolen. It also provided a specific description of the Defendant's vehicle - a "late model dark green in color Jeep Cherokee."
After the filing deadline, the trial court granted the seizing agency's motion to amend the complaint to allege the robbery of a Citizens Bank. The amended complaint not only identified a new robbery date and location but also identified a different bank teller, described a different manner in which the Defendant demanded money, identified a different amount of money stolen, and identified the Firebird as the vehicle used to flee the scene.
The DCA held that the trial court erred in finding that the amended verified complaint, properly identifying the Firebird as having been used in a robbery described in the amended complaint, related back to the date of the initial complaint for filing deadline purposes. The allegations in the amended complaint did not arise from the same conduct, transaction, or occurrence as those in the original complaint.
Neither did the amended complaint make more specific what had already been alleged generally. Instead, the amended complaint set forth entirely new facts and details.
In WHITTAKER v. STATE, No. 2D09-2715, (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 27, 2010), the DCA reversed revocation of the Defendant's probation because the trial court based it findings of new law violations solely on hearsay. The Defendant was accused of fraudulent use of a credit card at a store.
However the transaction was not properly authenticated because no witness with the requisite knowledge testified that surveillance photographs of the Defendant were a fair and accurate representation of what occurred at the store. In addition, testimony that the photographs depicted the use of the stolen card was hearsay because it was based on information an officer had received from a store employee who did not testify at the violation hearing. Therefore the trial court erred in relying on this evidence in finding the new law violation of fraudulent use of a credit card.
In WALKER v. STATE, No. 2D08-6049 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 27, 2010), the Defendant was convicted and sentenced for second-degree murder and armed burglary of a dwelling. Because the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the lesser included offense of manslaughter by act, the DCA reversed the murder conviction and remanded the case for a new trial.
The standard jury instruction on manslaughter that was in effect at the time of his trial was erroneous because it includes as an element of manslaughter that the defendant intentionally caused the death of the victim. Under Florida law, the crime of manslaughter by act does not require proof that the defendant intended to kill the victim. (The standard jury instruction on manslaughter was amended in December 2008, modifying the intent element to be the intent to commit an act that causes a victim's death.)
In MANUEL v. STATE, No. 2D08-3493 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 29, 2010), the DCA followed Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010), for the rule that a sentence of life without the possibility of parole imposed on a juvenile offender for a non-homicide crime constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment.
