In BUTLER v. YSUEM, No. SC09-1508 (Fla. Sep. 9, 2010) the Court discussed the torts of fraudulent misrepresentation and negligent misrepresentation.
In ROSS v. STATE, No. SC07-2368 (Fla. Sep. 9, 2010), in a revised opinion, the Court reversed convictions for first degree murder and robbery and sentences of death because during custodial interrogation of the Defendant over a period of several hours, police officers deliberately delayed administration of the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), obtained inculpatory admissions, and when the warnings were finally administered midstream, minimized and downplayed the significance of the warnings and continued the prior interrogation - all of which undermined the effectiveness of the Miranda warnings.
The opinion in this case calls into question the application of Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600 (2004) in Florida. Slip opinion at 34-39. In Seibert the Court disapproved police tactics of deliberately and intentionally withholding Miranda warnings. Here the Court concluded: "We agree with the dissent that Seibert applies once the determination is made that the police deliberately delayed administration of the Miranda warnings. However, the totality of the circumstances analysis under [Oregon v. ]Elstad[, 470 U.S. 298, 304 (1985)] also includes a multiplicity of factors that impacts the ultimate determination of voluntariness. We thus disagree with the dissent that administration of the Miranda warnings alone will suffice to render the statements admissible, absent a deliberate delay. The United States Supreme Court's opinion in Elstad and this Court's precedent in Ramirez [v. State, 739 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 1999),] support an application of a totality of the circumstances analysis when warnings are delivered midstream during an ongoing interrogation." Slip opinion at 38-39 (footnote omitted). "The caselaw demonstrates that the analysis of the admissibility of statements made following a custodial interrogation and after the delayed administration of Miranda warnings is based on the totality of the circumstances, with the following being factors important in making this determination: (1) whether the police used improper and deliberate tactics in delaying the administration of the Miranda warnings in order to obtain the initial statement; (2) whether the police minimized and downplayed the significance of the Miranda rights once they were given; and (3) the circumstances surrounding both the warned and unwarned statements including 'the completeness and detail of the questions and answers in the first round of interrogation, the overlapping content of the two statements, the timing and setting of the first and second [interrogations], the continuity of police personnel, and the degree to which the interrogator's questions treated the second round as continuous with the first.' In addition, there are other circumstances to consider on a case-by-case basis, such as the suspect's age, experience, intelligence, and language proficiency." Slip opinion at 39-41 (footnotes omitted).
In STATE v. VALDEZ, No. 2D09-1145 (Fla. 2d DCA Sep. 10, 2010), the DCA reversed dismissal of a case for failure to afford a speedy trial. The Defendant filed a written notice of expiration of speedy trial and motion for discharge on the 176th day after his arrest. The trial court scheduled the trial for the eleventh day of the recapture period. On the day of trial, counsel for the Defendant moved to dismiss for lack of discovery and a motion to continue for lack of discovery, to be charged to the State. The State argued that it had e-mailed the discovery to defense counsel nearly thirty days late and only five days prior to trial.
The DCA held that the trial court erred in granting the Defendant's motion for discharge because the recapture period had not expired. The trial court should have rescheduled the trial for any of four remaining days. The defendant was not irreparably prejudiced by the State's failure to timely provide discovery. As long as discovery is provided in time to allow the defendant to utilize it prior to the expiration of speedy trial, including the recapture period, there is no prejudice. Here any prejudice to the defendant's preparation could have been cured by a short continuance to a date still within the speedy trial time. Where a sanction is available to the trial court that will provide relief to the defendant and permit the State to move forward with its case within the speedy trial and recapture periods provided by the rules, the trial court should not take the harsh action of discharging the defendant.
