In MUNGIN v. STATE, No. SC09-2018 (Fla. Oct. 27, 2011), the Defendant was convicted of first degree murder. He brought a claim for post-conviction relief based on newly discovered evidence and the rules in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972). A witness came forward whose affidavit completely contradicted a critical State witness on a material detail, whether the State witness could have seen the Defendant leaving the crime scene immediately after the murder. See slip opinion at 17. The new witness also contradicted the same material detail in a police report on which trial counsel for the Defendant had relied. The Court reversed denial of postconviction relief and remanded the claim to the postconviction court for an evidentiary hearing pertaining to the allegations that the trial testimony of the State's witness and the police report were false.
In STATE v. SEYMOUR, No 2D09-4789 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 26, 2011), a police "officer driving a marked patrol car witnessed [the Defendant] and two other men standing on a sidewalk flagging down the car that was driving ahead of the officer. That car slowed but did not stop. The three men then began to flag the officer down while his patrol car was still about fifty feet away from them. The officer slowed down and stopped his vehicle in the middle of the roadway about twenty feet from the men. It was just before 1 a.m., and as the officer exited his patrol car, he activated his emergency lights. The three men immediately began to walk away from the officer, and the two men with [the Defendant] dropped items to the ground as they walked. [The Defendant], however, carried a backpack. At the hearing on [the Defendant]'s motion to suppress, the officer testified that it appeared to him that [the Defendant] was trying to carry the backpack in front of him as if to shield it from the officer's view. He further testified that it appeared that the two men with [the Defendant] were attempting to conceal [the Defendant] and his bag from the officer. Based on this suspicious behavior, the officer drew his weapon and ordered all three men to the ground." Slip opinion at 2.
The DCA concluded that the trial court erred in determining that the officer detained the Defendant at the time he activated his emergency lights, citing G.M. v. State, 19 So. 3d 973, 974 (Fla. 2009), holding that there is no per se rule that "the activation of police lights is dispositive of a finding that an individual has been 'seized' under the Fourth Amendment" but rather that "activation of police lights is only one important factor to be considered in a totality-of-the-circumstances analysis of whether a seizure in the constitutional context has occurred." The DCA also held that "the contact did not turn into a detention until the officer drew his weapon and ordered the men to the ground. At that point, however, the officer had the necessary well-founded, articulable suspicion to detain the three men. Although the three did not engage in headlong flight upon seeing the officer, once it became apparent that it was a police officer who had stopped, the three immediately turned to walk away, dropping items from their hands and attempting to conceal the fact that they were carrying a backpack. This, combined with the fact that the only reason the officer had stopped in the first place was because the three had flagged him down and had been attempting to flag down other vehicles, amounts to reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." Slip opinion at 4-5.
In CAMPBELL v. STATE, No. 2D11-805 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 28, 2011), the DCA held that Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.172(g), which addresses withdrawal of pleas, applies only prior to sentencing. After sentencing Fla. R. Crim.
P. 3.170(l) applies, and allows withdrawal of a plea only for the specific reasons listed in Fla. R. App. P. 9.140(b). The court certified conflict with Cox v. State, 35 So. 3d 47 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010).
In ARANGO v. STATE, No. 2D09-2005 (Fla. 2d DCA Oct. 26, 2011) the trial court entered restitution orders after the Defendant filed a notice of appeal. The DCA reversed the restitution awards because the notice of appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction.
In GRAY v. STATE, No. 4D09-3563 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 26, 2011), the Defendant appealed denial of post-trial juror interviews. After the jury retired to deliberate and the alternate juror was released, the alternate juror told defense counsel that several jurors felt "extremely" strongly that the defendant was guilty. The alternate juror gave defense counsel her phone number to inform her of the verdict; defense counsel did not call her or have any further contact with her.
The trial court denied the defendant's motion for juror interviews as legally insufficient. The DCA reversed, reasoning that a claim of premature deliberations may be asserted following a n adverse jury verdict because the timing of deliberations does not inhere in the verdict. Accordingly, the issue of whether deliberations were undertaken prematurely is an appropriate subject of judicial inquiry.
By contrast, a lone juror's attempt to discuss a defendant's guilt prematurely is insufficient to warrant juror interviews. Here, the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for juror interviews because the defendant's allegations suggested that multiple jurors were improperly discussing the case during trial and were expressing opinions as to the defendant's guilt before the close of the evidence.
In SOWERBY v. STATE, No. 5D11-1132 (Flaa 5th DCA Oct. 28, 2011), a vehicle driven by the Defendant was stopped by an officer "because the officer thought that the license plate on the vehicle was improperly mounted as it was not within the mounting brackets normally found on the back of an automobile. The license plate, however, was a dealer plate with a magnetic back. The testimony reveals that although the plate was not within the brackets on the trunk of the car, it was mounted on the trunk and was 'not higher than 60 inches and not lower than 12 inches from the ground and no more than 24 inches to the left or right of the centerline of the vehicle'". Slip opinion at 2. Therefore the DCA held that the license plate met the requirements of § 316.065(1), Florida Statutes (2010), and "the dealer plate was, in fact, lawfully mounted and within the statutory limits, and thus the stop could not have been based on a founded suspicion that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed." Slip opinion at 2. Therefore the DCA concluded that the stop was unlawful and the Defendant's motion to suppress should have been granted.
