In UNITED STATES v. TINKLENBERG, No. 09-1498 (May 26, 2011) the Court held that the Federal Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 et seq., provides that in "any case in which a plea of not guilty is entered, the trial ... shall commence within seventy days" from the later of (1) the "filing date" of the information or indictment or (2) the defendant's initial appearance before a judicial officer (i.e., the arraignment). An exception, § 3161(h)(1)(D), excludes "delay resulting from any pretrial motion, from the filing of the motion through the conclusion ofthe hearing on, or other prompt disposition of, such motion". The Court held that this provision stops the speedy trial clock from running automatically upon the filing of a pretrial motion, irrespective of whether the motion has any impact on when the trial begins.
In DELGADO v. STATE, No. SC09-2030 (Fla. May 26, 2011), the Defendant stole a truck from a parking lot. He was apparently unaware that an infant was asleep in a rear seat. He was convicted of burglary of an occupied conveyance, grand theft of a motor vehicle (auto theft), and kidnapping. The Court considered whether a defendant commits the crime of kidnapping with the intent to commit or facilitate an underlying felony where the evidence produced at trial fails to establish that he or she had knowledge of the victim's presence before or during the execution of that underlying felony.
The Court held that the crime of kidnapping requires a specific intent on the part of the defendant. Section 787.01(1), Florida Statutes (2006), codifies the offense and sets forth four separate categories of specific intent, the establishment of any one of which wpuld support a conviction under the statute. Faison v. State, 426 So. 2d 963 (Fla. 1983), provides a framework for analyzing the facts of a case to determine whether a defendant's conduct amounts to a confinement crime under section 787.01(1)(a)2, distinct from other criminal charges involving forcible felonies. Here the Court held that because a literal application of § 787.01(1)(a)2 would convert any forcible felony into two distinct felonies - kidnapping and the underlying felony - applying the statutory language in addition to the three-part test would justifiably serve to limit that provision's broad scope. Under the proper analysis, to establish the offense of kidnapping pursuant to § 787.01(1)(a)2, the State must first demonstrate that every element of the statute has been satisfied before turning to the three-part test adopted in Faison. Slip opinion at 11. "Accordingly, where a defendant is charged with kidnapping under section 787.01(1)(a)2, the State must prove that the defendant was first aware of the victim's presence in order to kidnap that victim with a specific intent to commit or facilitate the commission of an underlying felony.... It is only after the evidence satisfies the preceding statutory elements that courts may then address whether the Faison test's three prongs apply." Slip opinion at 13.
The Court reasoned that because the language of the statute requires an overt act on the part of the defendant, and because that act must be performed with a specific intent to commit or facilitate the commission of an underlying felony, clearly a defendant must first have knowledge of an intended victim in order to effectuate his or her intent. Such knowledge should arise either before or during the commission of the underlying felony used to support the kidnapping charge. Slip opinion at 12-13.
In STATE v. AKINS, No. SC10-896 (Fla. May 26, 2011), the Defendant had been declared to be a habitual offender (HFO) pursuant to § 775.084 Florida Statutes (1991) before the imposition of his initial split sentence. When he later violated probation and has his probation revoked, the sentencing order did not contain any language regarding designation as an HFO. Months later, on its own motion, the trial court amended the judgment to adjudicate the Defendant as an HFO. The Supreme Court held that when sentencing a defendant for a violation of probation, if the oral pronouncement of sentence by the trial court, does not definitively demonstrate any intent to designate the Defendant as an habitual felony offender, subsequent imposition of an HFO status to the VOP judgment and sentence violated double jeopardy and amounted to an illegal sentence and manifest injustice.
In SHIVELY v. STATE, No. 2D09-3149 (Fla. 2d DCA May 25, 2011), the Defendant challenged a traffic stop that lead to a DUI arrest and other charges. An off-duty sheriff's deputy was working as a security officer at a parking garage in Tampa late at night. The officer saw that the Defendant was having trouble putting a parking token into the machine to raise the gate. The Defendant was moving the token "everywhere around like he just couldn't focus on it, getting it into the machine." The Defendant appeared confused, his eyes were bloodshot, and his speech was slurred. Vehicles coming down the garage exit ramp were backing up behind the Defendant's vehicle. The officer suspected that the Defendant impaired. He therefore diverted the other vehicles and directed the Defendant to back out of the exit lane and pull over against the garage wall where he would not block traffic. The Defendant did so. He then got out of his vehicle, staggered, and leaned against the vehicle to maintain his balance.
The DCA held that the officer properly exercised a "community caretaking function." But even if the officer's direction to the Defendant to move his vehicle was an investigative stop, the officer's actions were lawful. A legitimate concern for the safety of the motoring public can warrant a brief investigatory stop to determine whether a driver is ill, tired, or driving under the influence in situations less suspicious than that required for other types of criminal behavior. A stop may be justified even in the absence of a traffic infraction when the vehicle is being operated in an unusual manner.
In STATE v. RAMIREZ, No. 2D10-758 (Fla. May 27, 2011) the Defendant was charged with sexual battery on a victim under twelve and child abuse after it was discovered that a newly-enrolled student at a middle school had a two-year-old child. The Defendant gave a statement in which he confessed to the charged crimes. He later moved to suppress the statement because he was not offered the services of an interpreter who was fluent in the Defendant's Guatemalan dialect, Mam. That motion was denied by a circuit judge who was not the trial judge.
After the trial, the Defendant moved for a new trial arguing that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress. The trial judge (who did not decide the initial motion to suppress) granted the motion without hearing any substantive argument or making any findings on the record except to say he had "severe issues in this case" because the Defendant "was convicted of an offense that carries a mandatory life sentence." The order granting the motion states in its entirety that the judge who denied the motion to suppress "erred as a matter of law in finding that the defendant 'knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda Warnings' with the aid of a Spanish interpreter because the defendant is not fluent in Spanish. The defendant is fluent in MUM [sic] which is a unique dialect and would require a special interpreter." The State appealed.
The DCA held that a trial court has the inherent power to reconsider its previous ruling on a motion to suppress even after the jury has returned its verdict, and there is no requirement that new evidence be adduced to support the ruling. There is authority for the proposition that a successor judge may vacate or modify a predecessor's interlocutory rulings. However, regarding motions to suppress, a successor judge is permitted to reconsider the interlocutory ruling of a predecessor judge denying the motion, but such reconsideration must be based on evidence adduced before the successor judge.
The DCA reasoned the original judge denied the Defendant's suppression motion after a pretrial evidentiary hearing. The successor judge, conducted the trial of the case, heard evidence pertaining to the suppression issue, and observed the Defendant's language abilities at trial. Thus, the trial judge could have reconsidered the Defendant's motion to suppress based on the evidence adduced at trial. However, he did not do so. Instead, he granted the Defendant's motion for new trial, indicating that the original judge "erred as a matter of law in finding that the defendant 'knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda Warnings' with the aid of a Spanish interpreter because the defendant is not fluent in Spanish. The defendant is fluent in MUM [sic] which is a unique dialect and would require a special interpreter." Slip opinion at 4-5. The DCA held that in so ruling, the successor judge exceeded his authority by conducting something akin to an appellate review of the prior judge's ruling. Because the successor judge simply did not have the legal authority to conduct the appellate review of the earlier ruling on the motion to suppress, we reverse the order granting a new trial.
