In REYNOLDS v. UNITED STATES, No. 10-6549 (Jan. 23, 2012), the Court observed that the federal Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 42 U. S. C. §16901 et seq., requires persons convicted of certain sex crimes to provide state governments with (and to update) information, such as names and current addresses, for inclusion on state and federal sex offender registries. Failure to do so can result in criminal penalties. However the Court held that the statutory registration requirements do not apply to sex offenders convicted before the Act became law until such time as the Attorney General promulgates of a valid rule applicable to all such offenders.
In UNITED STATES v. JONES, No. 10-1259 (Jan 23, 2012), the Court held that installation of a GPS tracking device on a vehicle and use of that device to monitor the movements of the vehicle, constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. Such a search is prohibited absent a valid warrant. [Editor's note: In an opinion authored by Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Kennedy, Thomas, and Sotomayor, J.J., the majority decided the case on narrow grounds, reasoning that attachment of the device to the vehicle was a physical trespass and therefore a violation of "that degree of privacy against government that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted", citing Kyllo v. United States, 533 U. S. 27, 34 (2001). The majority very carefully avoided application of the formulation that a Fourth Amendment violation occurs when government officers violate a person's "reasonable expectation of privacy". See Katz v. United States, 389 U. S. 347, 360 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). In a thoughtful concurring opinion, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test augmented, but did not displace or diminish, the common law trespassory test. Justice Sotomayor held that reliance upon the trespassory test by the majority reflects an irreducible constitutional minimum: when government agents physically invade personal property to gather information, a search occurs. Therefore application the common law of trespass suffices to decide this case, but she also suggested that the Katz test would have application in other situations. In another concurring opinion, Alito, J., joined by Ginsburg, Breyer, and Kagan, J.J., would have applied the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" formulation to the instant facts.]
In HAY v. STATE and HAY v. STATE, Nos. 2D10-1596 and 2D10-1678 (Fla. 2d DCA Jan. 27, 2012), the court considered the denial of a motion to suppress information obtained by police from a physician in a "doctor shopping" investigation of both Mr. and Mrs. Hay. The DCA held in the absence of any evidence in the record that police had attempted to provide either Mr. or Mrs. Hay with notice or to obtain a court-issued subpoena before contacting the Hays' doctors, the following statements by their doctors and the doctors' employees must be suppressed: (1) statements confirming that either Mr. or Mrs. Hay was a patient, (2) statements that the doctors had prescribed controlled substances to either Mr. or Mrs. Hay, (3) statements that neither Mr. nor Mrs. Hay had disclosed the receipt of a prescription for a controlled substance from another provider within the preceding thirty days, and (4) statements that the doctors would not have prescribed a controlled substance to either Mr. or Mrs. Hay if the doctors had known that he or she had received a prescription for a controlled substance within the preceding thirty days.
In SANDERS v. STATE, No. 4D10-3865 (Fla. 4th DCA Jan. 25, 2012), the Defendant was a passenger on a commercial flight from Phoenix, Arizona to Fort Lauderdale, Florida. She allegedly stole $500 from a fellow passenger’s purse. A flight attendant intervened and compelled the Defendant to return the money. The airplane was not over Florida at any point when the theft or recovery of the money took place. The Defendant was arrested by the Broward County Sheriff and was charged with grand theft. The DCA held that the trial court should have granted the Defendant's motion to dismiss because all of the elements of grand theft occurred entirely before the plane reached Florida's territory. Therefore the Florida trial court lacked jurisdiction.
In CRAIN v. STATE, No. 1D10-2145 (Fla. 1st DCA Jan. 24, 2012), the Defendant was convicted of violating § 322.34(5) Florida Statutes (2009), for driving while his license was revoked. Section 322.34(5) makes it a third degree felony for a person to drive while his driver's license is revoked pursuant to section 322.264 Florida Statutes (2009). Apparently the Defendant never had a Florida driver's license, or any other. The DCA reversed the felony conviction, but remand for entry of judgment for driving without a license, a lesser included misdemeanor. The DCA reasoned that the Legislature clearly defined "driver's license" as a certificate authorizing an individual to drive a motor vehicle. See § 322.01(17), Fla. Stat. (2009). “Revocation” is defined as the termination of a licensee's privilege to drive. See § 322.01(36), Fla. Stat. (2009). Chapter 322 does not define "driving privilege". Here the Defendant was convicted of violating § 322.34(5), which provides: "Any person whose driver's license has been revoked pursuant to s. 322.264 (habitual offender) and who drives any motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while such license is revoked is guilty of a felony of the third degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082, s. 775.083, or s. 775.084." Although certain provisions in chapter 322 contain the term "driving privilege," the provisions that pertain to cases like the present case refer only to a "driver’s license", which is "a certificate that... authorizes an individual to drive a motor vehicle." Section 322.34(5), under which appellant was convicted of a third-degree felony, does not outlaw driving by drivers who have never been issued a license to drive. However § 322.03(1) Florida Statutes (2009) proscribes driving without a valid driver’s license. Driving without a valid license is a second degree misdemeanor. See § 322.39, Fla. Stat. (2009).
The DCA concluded that courts must apply a statute as they find it, leaving to the legislature the correction of assorted inconsistencies and inequalities in its operation. Therefore the Defendant, who never had a driver's license could violate § 322.03(1), but not § 322.34(5). The 1st DCA was careful to point out conflict with the Second District Court in Carroll v. State, 761 So. 2d 417, 419 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000). The Carroll court reasoned that, since the Legislature used the term "driving privilege" in § 322.271(1)(b) when referring to § 322.27(5), which uses the term "driver’s license," the Legislature intended the terms "to mean the same thing and to apply equally to either situation." On that basis, the second district court found that Carroll’s "lack of a driver’s license did not relieve him from conviction as a habitual traffic offender whose driver's license (driving privilege) had been revoked or suspended." Id. See also State v. Bletcher, 763 So. 2d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000) (reversing trial court's dismissal of a charge under § 322.34(5), citing Carroll); Newton v. State, 898 So. 2d 1133 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) (per curiam affirmance citing Carroll and Bletcher). Slip opinion at 5, footnote 6.
