In ARRINGTON v. STATE, No. 2D08-2700 (Fla. 2d DCA Jan. 18, 2012), on motion for rehearing, the court considered the mandatory sentence of life without parole for juveniles convicted of felony murder when they were not the actual killer in the light of Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010). The court held that the mandatory life sentence required by § 985.56(3) Florida Statutes raises a sufficient risk of a cruel and unusual sentence that trial courts must consider whether such a sentence is proportionate given the circumstances of the juvenile's crime.
In WALKER v. STATE, No. 2D10-2754 (Fla. 2d FVA Jan. 20, 2012), the Defendant was convicted of home invasion robbery and second degree murder. At trial a witness testified, over hearsay objection, that he got information from the streets about who potentially committed the charged crimes. he same witness identified the Defendant. The DCA reversed the convictions, holding that it is not permissible for the State to have the benefit of statements from mystery witnesses or sources without the defendant having the right of confrontation and cross-examination. Where the inference from a statement of a mystery witness is that the witness has furnished evidence of the defendant's guilt, the testimony is hearsay and violates the defendant's right of confrontation. Such statements are not admissible to explain the police investigation or to establish a sequence of events. The prejudice of out-of-court statements used to relate accusatory information but offered simply to establish the logical sequence of events outweighs the probative value of such evidence, rendering it inadmissible.
In MOSLEY v. STATE, No. 2D10-5404 (Fla. 2d DCA Jan. 18, 2012), the cout held that once a circuit court has imposed a youthful offender sentence, it must continue that status upon resentencing after a violation of probation or community control.
In K.W. v. STATE, No. 2D11-685 (Fla. 2d DCA Jan. 20, 2012), the juvenile Defendant was convicted of violating § 316.027(1)(a) Florida Statutes (2010), which proscribes the crime of leaving the scene of a crash involving personal injury or death. Here the State did not present evidence that the Defendant either knew of the resulting injury or death or reasonably should have known from the nature of the accident. Therefore the DCA held that the Defendant was entitled to a judgment of dismissal.
In S.G. v. VURRO, No. 2D11-4944 (Fla. 2d DCA Jan. 20, 2011), S.G., a child, was found to be in indirect criminal contempt of a truancy order and was sentenced to five days of secure detention in the Southwest Florida Juvenile Detention Center. He filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus, asserting that a sentence to secure detention in a case such as his is illegal. The DCA agreed, reasoning that a delinquent child who has been held in indirect criminal contempt may be placed in a secure detention facility for five days for a first offense or for fifteen days for a second or subsequent offense. See § 984.09(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2011). A child who violates a truancy order, however, is not a delinquent child. Rather, a child who is found by the circuit court to have been habitually truant from school is deemed to be a "[c]hild in need of services." See § 984.03(9)(b), Fla. Stat. (2011).
As such, his subsequent violation of the truancy order is expressly excluded from the delinquency definition set forth in section 985.03(8), Florida Statutes (2011). Truancy orders are enforceable by contempt. See § 984.151(9). Whereas a delinquent contemnor may be punished by placement in secure detention, a child in need of services who commits a contempt of court may be placed in "a staff-secure shelter or a staff-secure residential facility solely for children in need of services," or if no such placement is available, in "an appropriate mental health facility or substance abuse facility for assessment" as provided by § 984.09(2)(b).
