In CONNICK et al. v. THOMPSON, No. 09-571 (Mar. 29, 2011), Thompson had been wrongfully convicted of attempted armed robbery because Connick, the prosecutor, failed to disclose exculpatory evidence under Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U. S. 83 (1963). Because of that conviction Thompson elected not to testify in his own defense in a later trial where he was charged with murder, and he was again convicted. Thompson spent 18 years in prison, including 14 years on death row. One month before Thompson's scheduled execution, his investigator discovered the undisclosed evidence from his armed robbery trial. The reviewing court determined that the evidence was exculpatory, and both of Thompson's convictions were vacated. Thompson alleged liability against Connick under two theories: (1) the Brady violation was caused by an unconstitutional policy of the district attorney's office; and (2) the violation was caused by Connick's deliberate indifference to an obvious need to train the prosecutors in his office in order to avoid such constitutional violations.
In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed Thompson's civil recovery pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 because a district attorney's office may not be held liable under § 1983 based on a single Brady violation. The Court held that Connick was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because Thompson did not prove that Connick was on actual or constructive notice of, and therefore deliberately indifferent to, a need for more or different Brady training. Therefore the Court did not reach not reach causation and did not address whether the alleged training deficiency, or some other cause, was the moving force behind the Brady violation. The Court reasoned that a municipality's failure to train its employees in a relevant respect must amount to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons with whom the untrained employees come into contact. A pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ordinarily necessary to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train. Attorneys are equipped with the tools to find, interpret, and apply legal principles. To prove deliberate indifference, Thompson needed to show that Connick was on notice that, absent additional specified training, it was highly predictable that the prosecutors in his office would be confounded by those gray areas and make incorrect Brady decisions as a result. In fact, Thompson had to show that it was so predictable that failing to train the prosecutors amounted to conscious disregard for defendants'rights under Brady. The Court held that he had not done so.
In STIEH v. STATE, No. 2D09-3158 (Fla. 2d DCA Apr. 1, 2011), the victim entered a hotel room occupied by the defendant and initiated a fight.
In the course of the fight, the defendant stabbed the victim. On a motion to correct opinion, the DCA held that § 776.013(3) Florida Statutes (2007) provides that a "person who is not engaged in an unlawful activity and who is attacked in [a] place where he or she has a right to be has no duty to retreat and has the right to stand his or her ground and meet force with force, including deadly force if he or she reasonably believes it is necessary to do so to prevent death or great bodily harm to himself or herself or another or to prevent the commission of a forcible felony." The statutory presumption that a defendant has a reasonable fear of great bodily harm sufficient to justify the use of deadly force applies when "[t]he person against whom the defensive force was used was in the process of unlawfully and forcefully entering, or had unlawfully and forcibly entered, a dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle, or if that person had removed or was attempting to remove another against that person's will from the dwelling, residence, or occupied vehicle." § 776.013(1)(a). The State is required to rebut the presumption beyond a reasonable doubt. Where, as here, the evidence leaves room for more than one inference of fact, at least one of which is consistent with the defendant's hypothesis of innocence, the court erred by failing to grant a Judgment of Acquittal on self-defense grounds.
In ROUSSONICOLOS v. STATE, No. 4D09-3449 (Fla. 4th DCA Mar. 30, 2011), the DCA held that a co-defendant's exculpatory prior testimony at a bond hearing was admissible over a hearsay objection. The DCA discussed the prior testimony exception at length.
In J.L. v. STATE, No. 5D10-1907 (Fla. 5th DCA Mar 25, 2011), the evidence established that the juvenile Defendant "stole a go-cart, a four-wheeler, and a skateboard from the victim's yard." Slip opinion at 2. The DCA held that to prove the offense of burglary of a dwelling, the State was required to prove that Defendant entered a "dwelling" with the intent to commit an offense therein. A dwelling includes the "curtilage". See § 810.02(1)(b)1, Fla. Stat. (2009). The Florida statutes do not provide a definition for the word "curtilage." However, in State v. Hamilton, 660 So. 2d 1038 (Fla. 1995), the Florida Supreme Court held that there must be "some form of an enclosure" in order for the area surrounding a residence to be considered part of the curtilage as referenced in the burglary statute; an individual who, without the homeowner's consent, enters an "open yard" with the intent to steal does not commit burglary. In the instant case, the DCA held that the "stolen items clearly were not attached to, nor a part of, the victim's house."
Therefore the court reversed the burglary conviction and remanded with directions for the trial court to enter judgment of the lesser included offense of trespass.
